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This paper proposes a new protocol for quantum dense key distribution. This protocol embeds
the benefits of a quantum dense coding and a quantum key distribution and is able to generate
shared secret keys four times more efficiently than BB84 one. We hereinafter prove the security
of this scheme against individual eavesdropping attacks, and we present preliminary experimental
results, showing its feasibility.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum dense coding (QDC) and quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) are two direct applications of funda-
mental quantum mechanics, both involving two parties,
Alice and Bob, exchanging some classical information.
By QKD Alice and Bob exchange secret random keys
to implement a secure encryption-decryption algorithm
(one-time pad) without meeting, and the security of the
distributed keys is based on the laws of quantum physics
[1].
Theoretically proposed in [2], QDC basically doubles
the capacity of transmission of a classical channel by lo-
cal operations on one particle of the EPR pair shared by
the two parties. QDC has received only partial experi-
mental verification [3] using polarization entangled states
of photons because of the inefficiently implemented Bell’s
state analysis [4] and a lack of security in the transmitted
information.
Recently, Bostroem and Felbinger [5] gave birth to the
original idea of a protocol encoding secure information by
local operations on an EPR pair, though rather proposing
a deterministic and secure transmission than implement-
ing a truly dense coding scheme.
In this paper we propose a protocol for the quan-
tum dense key distribution (QDKD) including the ad-
vantages of QKD and QDC in generating shared secret
keys and enhancing transmission capacity. In Section
II we present the protocol, in Section III we prove the
security of QDKD against the individual eavesdropping
attack, in Section IV the experiment proves the QDKD
feasibility, and in Section V we discuss the practical ef-
ficiency of the present protocol versus the most efficient
QKD ones.
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FIG. 1: QDKD scheme: particle B of an EPR pair |ψ−
AB
〉
is sent from Alice to Bob and backward. Alice’s and Bob’s
encoders selecting the local operation on particle (1B or ẐB)
together with the incomplete Bell’s measurement by Alice es-
tablish the key. Some pairs are randomly selected for non-
local measurement (the anticorrelation check performed by
spatially separated Alice and Bob measurements), as test of
the transmission security. The more general eavesdropping
attack is represented by the coupling of the EPR pair with
a larger Hilbert space in the initial state |eE〉 by means of
unitary operators ĴBE and K̂BE.
II. QDKD: THE PROTOCOL
The basic scheme of QDKD is presented in Fig. 1.
Alice produces pairs of particles in the singlet state
|ψ−
AB
〉 = 1√
2
(|0A1B〉 − |1A0B〉), and stores particle A in
her lab, whereas she acts randomly with gate 1B or ẐB on
particle B and then sends it to Bob. As ẐB|0B〉 = |0B〉,
and ẐB|1B〉 = −|1B〉, Alice’s random selection of gate 1B
or ẐB encodes the bits of her secret key on the EPR pair,
1B|ψ
−
AB〉 = |ψ
−
AB〉 −→ bit 0
ẐB|ψ
−
AB
〉 = −|ψ+
AB
〉 −→ bit 1, (1)
2with |ψ+AB〉 =
1√
2
(|0A1B〉+ |1A0B〉).
Bob randomly switches particle B towards either his
measurement or his encoding apparatus. In one case
Bob projects particle B on the base {|0B〉, |1B〉} while
in the other case, Bob, analogously to Alice, randomly
acts with 1B or ẐB on particle B and then sends it back
to Alice. When she receives it, her measurement appa-
ratus performs an incomplete Bell’s state analysis, i.e.
a projection on |ψ+AB〉 or |ψ
−
AB〉 of the two-particle state
composed by the previously stored particle A and par-
ticle B. When Bob’s apparatus projects particle B, Al-
ice’s measurement apparatus has to project particle A on
the base {|0A〉, |1A〉} instead of performing a Bell’s state
analysis. As Alice prepares only states |ψ−AB〉 and |ψ
+
AB〉,
Alice and Bob results should be always anticorrelated.
The anti-correlation check in Fig. 1, consists in compar-
ing Alice and Bob results, and guarantees the security
of the distributed keys against individual eavesdropping
attack [1].
After repeating this protocol enough times to produce
the keys, Alice discloses the results of her measurements
(|ψ−
AB
〉, |ψ+
AB
〉, |0A〉, |1A〉) publicly exposing solely to the
possibility of being monitored but not modified. Alice’s
measurements of |ψ+
AB
〉 and |ψ−
AB
〉 indicates the genera-
tion of the keys. In fact because Bob is aware of Alice’s
measurement results (as well as of his own operation 1B
or ẐB), he can extract the bit encoded by Alice and vice
versa. Specifically, measuring |ψ+AB〉 means that Alice
and Bob encoded 0 and 1 or 1 and 0, respectively (Alice
performed the operation 1B and Bob ẐB or vice versa).
The measurement of |ψ−AB〉, instead, means that Alice
and Bob encoded the same bit, 0 or 1 (Alice and Bob
performed the same operations on particle B, 1B or ẐB).
Thus, two keys are generated in this process, one pro-
duced by Alice and one by Bob. The key generation is
dense because any travelling particle B carries two ex-
changed bits, one belonging to key A and one to key B.
Since Alice’s results, disclosed publicly, correspond
to the sum (mod 2) of the bits of the two keys, i.e.
0 ⊕ 0 = 1 ⊕ 1 = 0 and 0 ⊕ 1 = 1 ⊕ 0 = 1, a possible
eavesdropper (Eve) on the public channel can intercept
some information by correlating the two keys, though
she does not get information on the single key. In other
words, key B is used to encrypt key A and viceversa, and
the results disclosed by Alice are the ”encrypted key A”
sent to Bob. In fact both keys are used twice, first to en-
crypt the other key, and then to encrypt Alice and Bob
messages.
This obviously induces a lack of security if the
one-time-pad protocol is implemented with both keys
straightforwardly. For this reason only key A is used
directly in the implementation of the one-time-pad pro-
tocol. The discussion on how Alice and Bob can lower
Eve’s information on key B in order to generate a ”new”
secret key B is a typical task in the field of computer
science and it is outside the scope of this paper.
Here we simply observe that Eve does not have any
direct information on the single key but only on the cor-
relation between the random bits in specific position of
the two keys. If Alice and Bob have common secret algo-
rithms for the permutation of the position of the bits of
one of the two key (e.g. key B), they can strongly reduce
Eve’s information on the two key. To guarantee the com-
plete security of the encrypted message we suggest to use
only key A for the one time pad, while the scrambled key
B can be used as a source for a cipher to generate a new
key.
III. QDKD: THE SECURITY PROOF
Let’s consider now the individual Eve’s attack (Fig. 1)
consisting in coupling particle B with an ancilla system
in the initial state |eE〉 by means of a general unitary
operator ĴBE. The Hilbert space A-B is widened by cou-
pling with the N-dimensional Hilbert space E of the an-
cilla system. After Bob’s operations, Eve couples again
her ancilla to system A-B by applying another unitary
operator K̂BE. Eventually she performs any POVMmea-
surement allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics on
the ancilla system E. Note that this approach is general
because any physical non-unitary interaction is equiva-
lent to a unitary one with a higher dimensional ancilla
space [6]. We represent the coupled system A-B-E after
Bob’s and Eve’s operations as
K̂BE1BĴBE|ψ
+
AB
〉 ⊗ |eE〉 = |µ
+
ABE
〉,
K̂BE1BĴBE|ψ
−
AB〉 ⊗ |eE〉 = |µ
−
ABE〉,
K̂BEẐBĴBE|ψ
+
AB
〉 ⊗ |eE〉 = |ν
+
ABE
〉,
K̂BEẐBĴBE|ψ
−
AB〉 ⊗ |eE〉 = |ν
−
ABE〉. (2)
As Alice prepares only states |ψ±AB〉, with probability
1
2
,
the results of the anti-correlation check performed by Al-
ice and Bob should always be anticorrelated. Eve’s action
induces a bit flip on particle B giving correlated results.
This is basically the signature of Eve’s presence.
We estimate now the probability Pcorr of correlated
results in the anti-correlation check
Pcorr = tr[ĴBEρ̂AB ⊗ |eE〉〈eE|Ĵ
†
BE(P̂00 + P̂11)], (3)
where P̂00 = |0A0B〉〈0A0B|, P̂11 = |1A1B〉〈1A1B| are
projection operators and ρ̂AB = 1/2|ψ
−
AB〉〈ψ
−
AB| +
1/2|ψ+AB〉〈ψ
+
AB|. From Eq.s (2) and the properties of uni-
tary operators K̂BE and ĴBE, it can be demonstrated that
Pcorr =
1
2
(1 + 〈µ+
ABE
|ν−
ABE
〉). (4)
The mutual information Is:r between the sender (s),
preparing and sending states ρ̂n with probability pn, and
the receiver (r) satisfies the Holevo bound [7]
Is:r ≤ Is:r = S(ρ̂)−
∑
n
pnS(ρ̂n), (5)
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FIG. 2: Plots of IB:E (a) and IA:E (b) versus Pcorr and q.
where S(ρ̂) is the Von Neumann entropy [7] of the generic
state ρ̂, and ρ̂ =
∑
n
pnρ̂n. Note that, even if the receiver
performs the more general POVM measurements on the
quantum state ρ̂, there is no guarantee that he can reach
the Holevo bound Is:r.
Following the same argumentation leading to Eq. (4),
the Holevo bounds IB:E and IA:E are expressed in terms
of Pcorr and q = 〈µ
+
ABE
|ν+
ABE
〉. Fig. 2 plots IB:E and
IA:E versus Pcorr and q, showing that the anti-correlation
check provides an estimate of the maximum information
obtainable by Eve. From this estimate Alice and Bob es-
tablish the security level of the bits exchanged. This also
implies that Eve cannot avoid to disclose herself when at-
tacking individually the qubit on the quantum channel.
Moreover Eve’s possibilities have been overestimated
in deriving IB:E and IA:E. In fact Eve is assumed to
perform any POVM on the final state of the whole system
A-B-E. This is obviously not the case, as she can perform
any POVM on the final state of her system E, but on
system A-B she only knows the results disclosed during
the public discussion.
In any practical implementation of QKD protocols, Al-
ice and Bob distill from the noisy and possibly insecure
key a nearly noise-free and secure key by means of er-
ror correction and privacy amplification [8]. Alice’s and
Bob’s capability of recovering two secure cryptographic
keys (key A and key B) on the face of Eve’s presence, is
given, though in some cases too restrictively [9], by the
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FIG. 3: QDKD set-up: photon pairs are generated by SPDC
in type II nonlinear crystal (NLC2) pumped by the pulsed
laser system (GL, Ti:Sa and NLC1). The bits of the keys are
encoded in the phase of the entangled state by means of half-
wave plates (HWPs). The incomplete Bell’s state measure-
ment is performed with an interferometer analogous to the one
used in [3], consisting of a 50:50 beam splitter (BS), interfer-
ence filters (IFs), fiber couplers, fibers integrated polarizing
beam splitters (PBS), single-photon detectors. M stands for
mirror, DM dichroic mirror, L lens, CC birefringence com-
pensation crystals.
condition IA:B > IA:E and IA:B > IB:E [10], where IA:B is
the mutual information between Alice and Bob. IA:B can
be simply calculated considering the capacity of a noisy
channel of quantum bit error rate Q, as IA:B = 1−H(Q),
where H is the Shannon entropy of a binary channel [11].
To ensure the security of the two generated keys, we re-
place IA:E and IB:E with the maximums of IA:E and IB:E
found in q = 0, for any Pcorr. Regardless differences in
functions IA:E and IB:E, it has been demonstrated that
IA:E|q=0 = IB:E|q=0 = H(Pcorr) for any values of Pcorr.
This means that Alice and Bob can distill common secret
keys when
H(Q) +H(Pcorr) < 1. (6)
IV. QDKD: THE EXPERIMENT
We implemented experimentally a proof of principle of
QDKD protocol by the scheme of Fig. 3.
The source of entangled photons in a singlet state is
a 0.5 mm long BBO nonlinear crystal (NLC2) pumped
by ultrashort pulses (150 fs) at 415 nm from a second
harmonic (obtained from NLC1) of a ultrashort mode-
locked Ti-Sapphire with repetition rate 76 MHz pumped
by a 532 nm laser (GL). NLC2 realizes a non-collinear
type II phase matching, to obtain polarization entangled
state |ψ−〉 at 830 nm, where |0〉 [|1〉] stands for hori-
zontal [vertical] polarization [12]. Alice’s bit encoding
procedure consists in taking on and off, in the quan-
tum channel B, an half-wave plate (HWP) with optical
4axis parallel to the horizontal polarization state. Accord-
ing to Eq. (1) the HWP on means Alice’s encoding bit
1, while off corresponds to bit 0. The same holds for
Bob’s encoding apparatus. The Bell’s state analyzer is
a Hong-Ou-Mandel interferometer [13] together with two
polarization-measurement systems. To compensate for
the optical delays in the interferometer the 50:50 beam
splitter (BS) is mounted on a micrometric translation
stage. The anti-correlation check consists in polarization
measurements performed separately by Alice and Bob
on photons A and B respectively, when photon B is re-
flected by Bob’s BS towards his detection apparatus. As
a matter of fact Bob decides the ratio of pairs devoted
to this measurement since the reflectivity of his BS sends
randomly some photons B towards his polarization mea-
surement system. Note that Alice’s Bell-state-analyzer
is also suitable for polarization measurement, namely for
the anti-correlation check. Alice’s and Bob’s detection
apparatuses are composed by open air-fiber couplers to
collect the down-converted light in single-mode optical
fibers. The detection of photons according to their po-
larization is guaranteed by a fiber-integrated polarizing
beam splitter (PBS). Photons at the two output ports of
PBS are sent to fiber coupled photon counters (Perkin-
Elmer SPCM-AQR-14). These are indicated as 1h, 1v,
2h, and 2v in the Alice’s detection apparatus, and as Bh
and Bv in the Bob’s anticorrelation check. Interference
filters (IF, at 830 nm, 11 nm FWHM) are placed in front
of the fiber couplers to reduce stray-light.
Fig. 4 shows the interference profiles when both Alice
and Bob encode bit 0 (a), Alice encodes bit 1 and Bob bit
0 (b), both Alice and Bob encode bit 1 (c). Cases (a) and
(c), corresponding to a final state |ψ−AB〉, present peaks in
the coincidence counts from detectors 1h 2v or 1v 2h and
dips in the coincidence from detectors 1h 1v or 2h 2v,
since |ψ−
AB
〉 is spatially antisymmetric. By contrary case
(b), corresponding to the spatially symmetric final state
|ψ+
AB
〉, presents the complementary behavior. When the
paths of photons A and B differ more than their coher-
ence length, no interference occurs, and one obtains clas-
sical statistics for the coincidence count rates at the de-
tectors. For optimal positioning of BS, i.e. indistinguish-
able photon paths, interferences enables Alice and Bob
to read the encoded information. We measured Pcorr as
the ratio between the sum of coincidences from detectors
Bh 1h and Bv 1v corresponding to correlated results, and
the sum of coincidences between Bh 1h, Bv 1v, Bh 1v,
and Bv 1h, corresponding to both correlated and anticor-
related results. We obtained Pcorr < 0.05. The presence
of correlated counts together with the reduction of the
visibility of the interferometric profiles are basically due
to losses in optics, detection, electronics, and noise [14].
From the visibility in Fig. 4 we estimated Q = 3.3%, and
according with Eq. (6) H(0.033) +H(0.05) = 0.49 < 1.
V. FURTHER DISCUSSION
According to Ref. [15], the theoretical efficiency of a
QKD protocol is defined as E = bs/(qt + bt), where, for
every step, bs is the expected number of secret bits ex-
changed by the two parties, qt is the number of qubits
exchanged on the quantum channel, and bs is the num-
ber of bits exchanged on the public channel. Any QKD
protocol satisfies E ≤ 1, while DQKD reaches the limit
value E = 1 as bs = 2, qt = 1 and bt = 1, and the bits
used for eavesdrop checking are neglected [15].
To our knowledge only two other protocols reach the
limit value of E = 1, one proposed by Cabello (high ca-
pacity Cabello protocol, HCCP) [15], and one by Long
and Liu (high capacity Long Liu protocol, HCLLP) [16].
Both protocols exploit the fact that a possible eavesdrop-
per, with no access to the whole quantum system at the
same time, cannot recover the whole information with-
out being detected, and both employ a larger alphabet,
a four dimensional orthogonal basis of pure states.
HCLLP appears hardly implementable as the detec-
tion system should perform a complete discrimination
between the four Bell’s states [4]. As to HCCP the de-
tection system is completely analogous to the interfer-
ometer implemented in the DQKD experiment. On the
contrary, in DQKD the source of photons and the encod-
ing apparatuses are quite simple (a type II parametric
down-conversion (PDC) source and two local operations),
while they are much more complicated in HCCP, where
they could be implemented by using a system to switch
between two PDC sources (one type I, and one type II)
and three local operations. In conclusion DQKD is a new
maximally efficient QKD protocol fully exploiting QDC
instead of a larger alphabet, and incorporating the prac-
tical advantages of HCCP and HCLLP.
In order to evaluate the effective potential applications
of DQKD we analyze the effects of losses, considering the
length L of the communication channel between Alice
and Bob. As the photon sent from Alice to Bob and
backwards travels over a distance 2L, the other photon
of the pair should be stored by Alice for a time 2L/c (c is
the speed of light in the quantum channel), for example
in a storage fiber ring of length 2L. Thus, for DQKD
the two photons should be kept decoherence-free for a
time 2L/c, as for HCCP, while for HCLLP they should
be kept decoherence-free for a time 3L/c.
In this respect we define a probability P that a pho-
ton is transmitted over the distance L [17]. The prac-
tical efficiency, η, of a QKD protocol can be evaluated
by the product between the theoretical efficiency E and
the probability that the photons are not lost in the com-
munication channels. In the case of DQKD (as well as
of HCCP) η = P2P2, because both photons travel for a
time 2L/c. In the case of BB84 protocol [18] η = 0.25P ,
as there is only one photon travelling for the path L,
and the theoretical efficiency is only E = 0.25. An op-
timized version of the BB84 exploits the possibility that
Bob measures the photon sent by Alice only after Al-
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FIG. 4: Coincidence rates obtained from pairs of detectors
1h, 2v or 1v, 2h (open square), and 1h, 1v or 2h, 2v (circle)
versus the displacement of the beam splitter.
ice has disclosed the measurement basis. In this case
E = 0.5, but after travelling for the distance L, the pho-
ton should be stored by Bob for an additional time L/c,
waiting for Alice classical bits, resulting η = 0.5P2.
Eventually, the practical efficiency of a QKD proto-
col depends on the quality of the quantum channel: if
P ≥ 71% the most efficient protocols is still DQKD (as
well as HCCP), if 50% ≤ P < 71% the more efficient is
the optimized BB84, while if P < 50% the best perfor-
mance are obtainable by the original BB84 protocol. For
example, if we consider 1550 nm commercial telecommu-
nication fiber, whose attenuation factor is 0.2 dB/km,
DQKD protocol is more efficient than BB84 protocols
for distance L shorter than 7.4 km, for L > 15 km the
most efficient is the original BB84, while for intermedi-
ate distances the more suitable choice is the optimized
BB84. However, the forthcoming advent of a new gen-
eration of optical fibers, such as photonic-cristal fibers
(PCF) and Bragg fibers with predicted attenuation fac-
tors between 10−2 dB/km and 10−4 dB/km or less, will
lead DKQD protocol advantageous over much longer dis-
tances, namely up to L ≃ 150 km corresponding to at-
tenuation of 10−2 dB/km and up to L ≃ 15000 km for
attenuation of 10−4 dB/km.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion the proposed protocol embeds the main
advantages of two quantum communication applications,
namely QKD and QDC, as it allows the generation of
secure cryptographic keys using only one travelling-qubit
for two bit of classical information.
The protocol has been proved to be secure against in-
dividual eavesdropping attack by using a non-local mea-
surement. We proved also that QDKD reaches the max-
imum of the efficiency of QKD protocols.
We performed a experimental implementation estab-
lishing the conditions for a secure QDKD. The experi-
ment in fact proved the feasibility of QDKD by showing
high-visibility interferometric profiles as well as low-noise
anticorrelation check. This is only the proof of principle
of the system described above for QDKD, as we are aware
that the actual system is not yet fast enough in switch-
ing the encoding operations. We are now focused on the
realization of fast switching ẐB gates by using Pockell’s
cells and HWPs.
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